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Initial Access

  • Initial Access The Art of Getting In The complete red team guide to Initial Access: Payload Development (DLL Sideloading, Shellcode Loaders, Syscalls), HTML Smuggling, Phishing (QR Code Quishing, Teams Phishing), AitM/MFA Bypass (Evilginx, Device Code Phishing), Password Spraying, Exploiting Public-Facing Applications, Vishing, Physical Access (Rubber Ducky, Bash Bunny), Supply Chain attacks with real-world APT case studies.

Case Studies

The MITRE ATT&CK website contains a number of real cases where each technique has been used. The examples listed here are just a bunch of further examples, particularly interesting because they illustrate all the intrusion steps that followed Initial Access.

Phishing

Just two resources (I am not even trying to provide a link to relevant incidents; I would not know where to start):

Phishing tools and services

Secure email (SPF, DKIM, DMARC)

These are very interesting topics but not part of this course.

Trusted Relationship

Case Studies

Also look at the "Procedure examples" in the MITRE ATT&CK technique.

Supply Chain Compromise

Case Studies

Also look at the References in the MITRE ATT&CK technique (and their sub-techniques).

SolarWinds

A major incident with national security implications.

Linux xz compression library

Over a period of over two years, an attacker worked as a diligent, effective contributor to the xz compression library, eventually being granted commit access and maintainership. Using that access, they installed a very subtle, carefully hidden backdoor into liblzma, a part of xz that also happens to be a dependency of OpenSSH sshd on Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, and other systemd-based Linux systems. That backdoor gives the attacker the ability to run an arbitrary command on the target system without logging in: unauthenticated, targeted remote code execution.

This attack was publicly disclosed on March 29, 2024 and it marks a watershed moment in open source supply chain security.

Because the backdoor was discovered before the malicious versions of xz Utils were added to production versions of Linux, “it's not really affecting anyone...BUT that's only because it was discovered early due to bad actor sloppiness. Had it not been discovered, it would have been catastrophic to the world.”

Interesting examples

  • Accounting Ukraine cyber-attack: Software firm MeDoc's servers seized "some of the initial infections were indeed spread via a malicious update to MeDoc. It is Ukraine's most popular accounting software. The cyber-attack - a variant of an earlier virus called Petya - hit businesses around the world including the shipping firm Maersk"
  • System utility CCleaner Attack Timeline—Here's How Hackers Infected 2.3 Million PCs Hackers compromised the company's servers for more than a month and replaced the original version of the software with the malicious one. The malware attack infected over 2.3 million users who downloaded or updated their CCleaner app between August and September last year from the official website.
  • Digital signature, government certification authority Operation SignSight: Supply-chain attack against a certification authority in Southeast Asia The attackers modified two of the software installers available for download on the website of the Vietnam Government Certification Authority and added a backdoor.
  • Browsers infected by government websites, infected by a website plugin Government websites hit by cryptocurrency mining malware Thousands of sites, including NHS services and the ICO, have been infected by malware that forces visitors’ computers to mine cryptocurrency while using the site. The cryptojacking script was inserted into website codes through BrowseAloud, a popular plugin that helps blind and partially-sighted people access the web.

Browser extensions

Software development

You develop software and you could unwillingly distribute malicious software to your customers:

...or you could suffer stealing of YOUR information

Firmware and routers

National Security

Antivirus (!)

  • Critical eScan Supply Chain Compromise Active supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product. Malicious updates were distributed through eScan’s legitimate update infrastructure, resulting in the deployment of multi-stage malware to enterprise and consumer endpoints globally. This document provides IoCs.

Security scanner (!)

Defense best practices

Analyses